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Abstract Despite the strong resilience of the French food
industry during the recent economic crisis, the bankruptcy rate
for this sector has dramatically increased since 2010. This
paper focuses on the economic and financial determinants of
firm exit due to bankruptcy in the French food industry and
compares them with those for other manufacturing industries.
Based on a large sample of firm-level data for the period
2001–2012, we show that the bankruptcy risk pattern differs
between food industry firms and other manufacturing firms.
Firm productivity is an important determinant of a firm’s prob-
ability of going bankrupt; productivity begins deteriorating
3 years before a failure. Controlling for firm productivity, we
also show that credit cost has a positive and significant impact
on the probability of bankruptcy. However, we observe small-
er effect of credit cost on firms’ bankruptcy risk. In contrast,
productivity appears to have an important beneficial effect on
bankruptcy risk reduction.
Keywords Firm exit . Firm bankruptcy . Cost of credit .
Productivity . Food industry
JEL Classification G33 . G21 . D24
Introduction
Every year in France, more than 3500 manufacturing compa-
nies file for bankruptcy (Stat Info 2013), of which nearly one
third are declared in the food industries.1 The French food
industries demonstrated considerable resiliency compared to
the manufacturing industry during the recent economic crisis
(Aleksanyan 2015). According to Fougère et al. (2013), nearly
half of the failures during the period 2008–2010 in the French
manufacturing industry can be attributed to the crisis.
However, the crisis peak of bankruptcies that occurred in the
manufacturing industry was not observed in the food industry.
Indeed, according to data from the Banque de France and our
calculations, the annual bankruptcy rate was approximately
2.7 %2 in 2009 in the manufacturing industry compared with
0.8 % in the food industry. This disparity is often explained by
the inertia of household food and beverage consumption,
which supported firm activity during the crisis. However, this
situation deteriorated over the period between 2010 and 2012
for food industry firms, and the French food industry has
reported a dramatic increase in bankruptcy cases.3 The bank-
ruptcy rate of the food industries nearly doubled between
2010 and 2012 (Fig. 1).
Some of these bankruptcies concerned large and econom-
ically important business units and reflected the increasing
difficulties confronting the French food industries. For exam-
ple, the group Doux, one of the French leaders in processing
and preserving poultry, declared bankruptcy in 2012; GAD
Ltd. (slaughterhouses, cutting and processing pork) filed for
bankruptcy at the beginning of 2013; it was announced in
1 In this paper, food industries refer to the manufacture of food products,
beverages, and tobacco products (agrifood industries) including the man-
ufacture of bakery and farinaceous products.
2 See Appendix for details about the computation method.
3 See Table 7 in Appendix.
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2014 that two French subsidiaries of the international seafood
group Marine Harvest would be closed down; and Tilly-
Sabco, a company operating in the chicken-slaughtering busi-
ness that produces chicken-based sausages, repeatedly expe-
rienced bankruptcy risk in 2013. The primary difficulties men-
tioned by the food companies’ leaders and food industry ex-
perts are related to rising commodity prices, unequal negoti-
ating power with retail trade groups with respect to setting
product prices or quantities, the reduction of European subsi-
dies, especially for the poultry meat industries, and competi-
tiveness issues in the European market for certain industries
(e.g., low labor costs for German slaughterhouses relative to
French slaughterhouses). The macroeconomic environment
and demand-side factors could also underlie the increase in
firm bankruptcies in the food industry during the period 2010–
2012. For example, according to the National Institute of
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE),4 the growth rate
of exports for food and beverages decreased considerably after
2010. In addition to this decrease in exports, the domestic
market also faced lower food demand: household food con-
sumption growth declined after 2010 in contrast to almost 2 %
growth during the period between 2009 and 2010.
The aim of this study is to analyze the impact of economic
and financial factors at the firm level on bankruptcy risk in the
French food industry and other manufacturing industries.
Firm bankruptcy is defined as the initiation of judicial reorga-
nization or liquidation proceedings, equivalent to the bank-
ruptcy definition stipulated by the French law. Bankruptcy
follows payment default or a situation in which the debtor
company becomes unable to repay its debts. Although bank-
ruptcy is part of the market selection process and can be con-
sidered to be the consequence of a firm’s inability to survive
market competition, it may entail multiple damaging repercus-
sions, occasionally of significant scale, in terms of job losses,
the destruction of assets, and of a productive base. For exam-
ple, according to our calculations, over the period 2001–2012,
the economic impact of French food industry bankruptcies
was equivalent to an average of nearly 2700 jobs each year
(the peak was in 2012, when more than 4000 jobs were affect-
ed by food industry bankruptcies).5
The aim of this paper is to understand the evolution of
firms’ bankruptcy risk and to identify the determinants of exits
due to bankruptcy. The size and age of firms are considered to
be the primary factors affecting bankruptcy risk: smaller or
younger firms are the most likely to file for bankruptcy.
Firms’ bankruptcy risk is also related to their economic per-
formance, the macroeconomic environment, and financing
conditions. Indeed, the hypothesis is that firms’ exits are not
only linked to their inefficiency. Firms’ financing conditions
also can play a role in the market selection process.
Difficulties in obtaining access to credit or banks’ tight credit
standards for firms can challenge these firms’ survival and
become a cause of exit. Therefore, firms with better access
to credit or those that obtain favorable credit covenants will
have a greater probability of survival. Moreover, even highly
productive firms may be forced to exit the market if they are
credit constrained or if the cost of credit is excessive. The
issues related to financing conditions are particularly relevant
in the context of the recent crisis for two reasons. First, debtor
interest rates for several categories of bank loans to non-
financial corporations changed slightly before, during, and
after the recent crisis,6 with a significant increase in the het-
erogeneity of lending conditions to firms (e.g., Avouyi-Dovi
et al. 2012). Second, the crisis may have induced credit ration-
ing by deteriorating the financing conditions faced by firms.
Indeed, in the context of an increased risk level, banks may
become more restrictive in granting credits to firms and there-
by deteriorate firms’ access to credit. However, Kremp and
Sevestre (2013) show that French small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) have not been strongly affected by credit
rationing after the 2008 crisis.
This study conducts an analysis of firm bankruptcy by ac-
counting for productivity-linked factors and firm financial
factors. Our model is based on Ericson and Pakes (1995)
and Olley and Pakes (1996), as well as on recent develop-
ments in Blanchard et al. (2012). In addition to the theoretical
considerations proposed in these papers, we also consider the
financing conditions faced by firms as one of the determinants
of firm exit. Based on this framework, our study analyses a
firm’s decision to exit if, given its capital stock, its productiv-
ity shock, its debt level, its cost of credit and its environment at
a given moment, it is more profitable to go bankrupt and get
the value of bankruptcy (i.e., the assets that remain to the firm
after bankruptcy proceeding) than to keep going and obtain
Fig. 1 Bankruptcy rate, %. Source: Firms’ balance sheets’ and
bankruptcies’ databases (Banque de France) and authors’ calculations
4 www.insee.fr/en/themes/theme.asp?theme=16&sous_theme=5.1 or see
Appendix, Fig. 3.
5 To calculate these statistics, we used the data from the bankrupt firms’
most recent available balance sheet information in the Banque de France
databases up to 3 years before the bankruptcy.
6 One of the reasons is that at the end of 2008, the European Central Bank
significantly reduced its main refinancing operations rate which in turn
triggered a decrease in the cost of bank loans to non-financial
corporations.
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the expected profits from continued operations. The empirical
part of our study provides an evidence on firms’ exit behavior
due to bankruptcy based on these theoretical considerations.7
Based on a rich microeconomic data set comprising firm bal-
ance sheet information merged with the firm bankruptcy re-
cordings database during the period 2001–2012, our econo-
metric analysis concentrates on firms’ bankruptcies in the
French food industry and compares them with other
manufacturing firms.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we outline the
general theoretical framework and selected findings from the
relevant literature on firm exit. The economic model is pre-
sented in the subsequent section. Then, we present the dataset
and the main descriptive statistics. The final section presents
our econometric specification and the estimation results and is
followed by conclusions.
A brief literature review
The importance of firm demography in explaining aggregate
economic outcomes such as growth, productivity, and innova-
tion has long been recognized. Since the 1980s, as more mi-
croeconomic data on firms’ lifetime trajectories (including
firm entry and exit) have become available, firm demography
has attracted greater interest from applied economists and
econometricians. The main findings concern firm mobility
as a key condition to the evolution of aggregate productivity,
the level of competitiveness, and the propensity to innovate at
a country or industry level. Indeed, on average, exiting
(entrant) firms are less (more) productive than incumbents.
Therefore, firm mobility (i.e., exit and entry) contributes to
the reallocation of resources and to the growth of aggregate
productivity through turnover-induced productivity gains.
Awell-documented stylized fact regarding firm mobility is
the heterogeneity of firm behavior concerning the decision to
exit (or to enter) the market (e.g., Roberts and Tybout 1997;
Caves 1998; Bartelsman and Doms 2000). Jovanovic (1982)
and Hopenhayn (1992) provide the first theoretical framework
for firm mobility in the context of firm heterogeneity. The
learning model advanced by Jovanovic (1982) suggests that
firms enter the industry without knowing their productive ef-
ficiency. Only after a certain period of time is their efficiency
revealed, and eventually, they decide either to stay or to exit
the sector if their efficiency is low. This notion of endogenous
exit was subsequently extended in the model developed by
Hopenhayn (1992) in a more general framework of industrial
equilibrium, taking into account the firms’ exogenous charac-
teristics (exogenous productivity shocks, the entry cost, aggre-
gate demand, etc.).
Ericson and Pakes (1995) more precisely exploit this idea
of firm heterogeneity inmodeling the firm exit decision. Firms
differ according to their realized state of success or efficiency
level. A high level of firm efficiency indicates its stronger
position relative to its competitors and to potential entrants.
According to Ericson and Pakes (1995), firm efficiency de-
pends, among other factors, on the return of firm investment.
In other words, to obtain high levels of efficiency, firms must
invest. Therefore, they select an investment level that maxi-
mizes their expected discounted profit. Next, firms compare
the value of their expected discounted profit with the oppor-
tunity cost of remaining (e.g., sell-off value) and decide
whether to exit or to continue their activity. Thus, Ericson
and Pakes (1995) demonstrate that both the investment level
and the decision to exit depend on the level of firm efficiency.
Ericson and Pakes’ (1995) model was further reconsidered by
Olley and Pakes (1996) in an empirical framework. Based on
plant-level data, they demonstrate that the probability of exit
depends on firm efficiency.
The models introduced by Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson
and Pakes (1995) implicitly assume that firms’ financial situ-
ations have no impact on exit decisions. However, recent stud-
ies, especially in the field of firm dynamics (including firm
exit), consider the role of credit market frictions and/or financ-
ing constraints (e.g., Cooley and Quadrini 2001; Osotimehin
and Pappadà 2015; Arellano et al. 2012) and Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn 2004). The Btoy^ model considering the role of
financial constraints in the context of firm dynamics is based
on Evans and Jovanovic (1989). In particular, these authors
provide a model of firm creation in the presence of liquidity
constraints. Extending Hopenhayn’s (1992) model, Cooley
and Quadrini (2001) propose a specification of firm dynamics
that takes the firms’ financing constraints into account. The
general premise of their study is that by controlling for firm
age and size, the financial frictions impact on firm dynamics,
including on firms’ exit. These authors consider an exogenous
exit, i.e., firms become unproductive and exit. Osotimehin and
Pappadà (2015) follow Cooley and Quadrini (2001) but con-
sider endogenous exit. According to their model, firm selec-
tion is influenced by imperfections in the credit market: pro-
ductive units can be forced to exit due to credit constraints,
whereas unproductive units can survive. Thus, in the presence
of financial frictions, firms may decide to exit due to credit
7 In this sense, our study differs from bankruptcy prediction literature
based on discriminant analysis as in Altman (1968), the very first model
to estimate probability of default using discriminant analysis. It turns out
that discriminant analysis is equivalent to the linear probability model for
a binary-dependent variable. Since the beginning of the 1980s, re-
searchers and practitioners also used logit and probit models to estimate
probabilities of bankruptcies, as in the Riskcalc models. The objective of
these methods is to predict bankruptcy occurrence or quantitatively eval-
uate bankruptcy risk using different financial and non-financial ratios that
best discriminates healthy firms from bankrupt firms. Themethodological
approach of our study is based on our theoretical considerations on firms’
exit behavior due to bankruptcy. Thus, our objective is to investigate the
causes of bankruptcy within our theoretical framework and does not
consider discriminant analysis to model bankruptcy prediction.
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rationing (for example, the firm is unable to cover its fixed
costs and opts to exit).
The primary empirical evidence supports the notion that
firm efficiency and the probability of exit are negatively
related. The following list of studies is not exhaustive. Baily
et al. (1992) show that the probability of firm death is high
among firms with low levels of productivity. Following a dif-
ferent methodology, Dwyer (1998) shows that firms at the
bottom of the productivity distribution have the highest exit
rates. Fariñas and Ruano (2005) also show that firms’ exit
behavior reflects the initial productivity heterogeneity, and
hence, higher productivity will reduce firms’ exit probability.
Based on French firm-level data, Bellone et al. (2006) show
that the closer firms are to their exit year, the lower their
productivity is. Blanchard et al. (2012) also use French firm-
level data (in the food industry) covering the period 1996–
2002 and show that productivity has a negative and
significant impact on firm exit probability. Based on the
French data, Boyer and Blazy (2014) consider among others
the firms’ financing characteristic effect on survival. They
show that sources of financing (personal financing as well as
bank financing) have a positive effect on survival.
The economic model
Our model is based on Ericson and Pakes (1995), Olley and
Pakes (1996), Ackerberg et al. (2007), as well as on recent
developments in Blanchard et al. (2012). We consider an en-
dogenous exit model, i.e., the firm’s optimal choice could be
to abandon its entrepreneurial project and exit the industry.
Firm success (or profitability, value, etc.) depends on several
factors, such as investments. At each period t, a firm with a
productivity level ω chooses its investment level such that it
maximizes its expected discounted profits.
Following Olley and Pakes (1996), we define the firm pro-
duction function as follows:
yit ¼ β0 þ βkkit þ βllit þ βaait þ ωit þ ηit ð1Þ
where k is the capital, l denominates labor, a denotes firm age,
ηit represents the factors that are unobservable by the firm i
and by the econometrician, and ωit is the firm-specific produc-
tivity observed by the firm i but unobservable by the
econometrician.
At each period, capital is defined on the basis of the capital
accumulation rule
kit ¼ 1−δð Þkit−1 þ iit ð2Þ
where iit is firm investment in period t. According to this
specification, capital is the non-flexible input. However, labor
is considered to be a flexible input. Labor is chosen and used
during period t.
We also assume that in each period, an active firm needs to
invest, Iit. If the investment exceeds the available internal re-
sources, the firmwill need to borrow, Bit. The firm is granted a
certain amount of one-period credit in each period, but it must
repay it at the end of the period: BRit = (1 + rBit)Bit, where rB is
the interest rate fixed by the bank. At this stage, we assume
that there is no credit rationing.
At each period, a firm’s profit is defined as follows:
πit ¼ R Kit; ait;ωit; γtð Þ− 1þ rBitð ÞBit ð3Þ
where R(Kit, ait, ωit, γt) is the firm’s revenue, and γt is firms’
economic environment at period t (for example, demand fac-
tors or the characteristics of the sector).8 One can regard this
equation as a conditional profit function (conditional on the
optimal choice of labor at period t).
In this framework, the exit decision can be modeled on the
basis of a Bellman equation:




R Kit; ait;ωit; γtð Þf − 1þ rBitð Þ Bit
þβE V Kitþ1; aitþ1;ωitþ1; rBitþ1;Bitþ1; γtþ1
 Θth ioo
ð4Þ
where ϕ is the opportunity cost (or the value of bankruptcy for
the firm), and Θt is the overall information available to the
firm at time t. Thus, the firm decides to exit if, given its capital
level Kit, its productivity ωit, the cost of credit rBit and the
amount of credit Bit, the opportunity cost of remaining active
is higher than the expected profit:
max
iit




Thus, the exit decision is based on a firm’s comparison of
expected discounted profits (EDP) with a certain opportunity
cost of staying, Ø.9 The exit rule is as follows: if EDP < ϕ, the
firm exits and receives ϕ. If EDP > ϕ, the firm continues its
activity and realizes the chosen level of investment, I.
Thus, we obtain the following decision rule for firm exit
given certain assumptions10:
χit ¼ 1 stayð Þ; if ωit ≥ω Kit; ait; rBit;Bit; γtð Þ
0 exitð Þ; otherwise
(
ð5Þ
8 Note that in this definition of profit, labor does not appear explicitly
because labor is the flexible input.
9 For example, here, in the event of exit due to bankruptcy, it can be the
value of bankruptcy for the firm or the assets remainingwith the firm after
judicial proceedings.
10 These assumptions are that the equilibrium exists and that the differ-
ence between expected profits and opportunity costs is increasing in
productivity.
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where ω Kit; ait; rBit;Bit; γtð Þ ¼ ωt Kit; ait; rBit;Bitð Þ is the pro-
ductivity threshold at industry level (or country level) for
firms with capital K, age a, cost of borrowing rBit, and amount
of borrowed capital Bit. In other words, the firm will continue
its activity if its productivity is greater than a certain threshold
level. Thus, first, the firm decides whether to exit. If the firm
stays, it realizes investment I. We can now express the prob-
ability of exit as follows:
P exitð Þ ¼ 1−P stayð Þ ¼ 1−P χit ¼ 1
Θith i ¼ P ωit ≥ωt Kit; ait;ωitð ÞΘith i
¼ 1−P χit ¼ 1
ωit;ωt Kit; ait; rBit;Bitð Þh i
¼ 1−eϕt ωit;ωt Kit; ait; rBit;Bitð Þ
 
¼ 1−ϕ ωit;Kit; ait; rBit;Bitð Þ
ð6Þ
Thus, the probability of exit will be as follows:
P exitð Þ ¼ f ωit;Kit; ait; rBit;Bitð Þ ð7Þ
According to this model, the firm’s probability of exit de-
pends on the capital level, firm age, productivity, and borrow-
ing conditions (cost of credit and amount borrowed).
Data description and descriptive statistics
The sample is obtained by merging data from the Banque de
France balance sheet database (Fiben Bilan) covering the pe-
riod 1998–2012 and the firm bankruptcy database covering
the period 2001–2013, also available from the Banque de
France. Our analysis separately considers the food industry,
the manufacturing industry excluding the food industry, and
the entire manufacturing industry. Merging these two data-
bases, we get a sample containing over 492,000 firm-year
observations covering the period 2001–2012. This is an un-
balanced panel data set with an average of approximately 35,
000 manufacturing companies per year. Notably, the Fiben
Bilan database includes a very small number of bankrupt firms
(only approximately 0.5 % of the total number of observations
over the period 2001–2012). From 2001 to 2012, the French
courts registered almost 4400 bankruptcies of manufacturing
business units per year, but each year fewer than 250 of these
bankrupt firms were in the balance sheet database the year of
the failure, and nearly 1000 bankrupt firms were observed at
most 3 years before the failure.
Our analysis is based on the following firm economic and
financial characteristics.11 Firm productivity or total factor
productivity (TFP) is estimated at the establishment level as
the residual of an estimated production function using labor,
capital (tangible assets), and intermediate inputs as inputs and
production level as the output. Our approach is based on the
semi-parametric estimator proposed by Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). According to this
method, the observed input choices are used to instrument
for the unobserved productivity to control for simultaneity
bias and selection bias, as in the case of Olley and Pakes
(1996).12 The simultaneity bias occurs because the firm has
prior knowledge of its productivity level at the time that input
decisions are made, and hence, the level of inputs chosen and
unobserved productivity shocks are correlated. Selection bias
occurs because certain firms survive over the period under
consideration. In other words, the bias emerges from the fact
that firms’ input decisions are made conditional on their sur-
vival (non-exit) and firms’ exit probability is related to their
productivity level. Thus, because firms can have some knowl-
edge of their productivity level prior to exit, the unobserved
productivity and inputs will be correlated conditional on not
exiting. By taking into account these methodological issues,
production functions and TFP are estimated at the division
level of the manufacturing sector according to the French
classification of activities.13
The cost of credit is measured as the ratio of firms’ financial
charges over total debt. As bank credit is the main financing
source for the firms in our sample, this variable is a better
measure of the interest rate on bank credit. Bank debt on total
assets is a proxy for firms’ amount of external debt due. Our
model also includes variables on firm age, the manufacturing
activity sub-sector, and a size categorical variable based on
firms’ total assets.
Bankrupt firms have different characteristics than healthy
firms (Table 1). Bankrupt firms are essentially SMEs (nearly
98 % of our sample). As the prior evidence indicates, bank-
ruptcy is a particular concern for small firms, especially due to
their limited resistance to external shocks and their high level
of operational and financial costs relative to large firms.
Moreover, the bankruptcy rate is higher for independent
SMEs, which suggests that independent SMEs are in a more
vulnerable position than those with a financial linkage to a
corporate group. Not surprisingly, a poor Banque de France
rating is linked to reported bankruptcy cases. In particular, for
the food industry, a high number of bankrupt firms had previ-
ously received a bad credit risk rating from the Banque de
France. There is also heterogeneity among the different sub-
sectors of the manufacturing sector: the food industry has the11 Our empirical modeling does not consider other firm risk-related var-
iables as in the Altman (1968) modeling for two reasons. First, the inclu-
sion of additional financial variables did not bring new information in the
model, and we consider that firm debt structure and financial cost are
good proxies to take into account firms’ financial characteristics.
Second, we assume that the firm size variable contains a lot of informa-
tion on firm risk-related factors and there is no need to add new variables
in the model.
12 This technique is broadly adopted for estimating firms’ productivity in
the literature. See, for example, Van Beveren (2012) for a detailed over-
view of the existing techniques to estimate total factor productivity at the
establishment level.
13 French classification of activities (NAF Rev. 2) is the national statisti-
cal classification of activities.
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lowest bankruptcy rate. Bankruptcy cases were declared more
often in the basic and fabricated metals industry.
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics on healthy
firms and firms that went bankrupt. In the latter case, we
separately consider observations corresponding to the year
of failure and observations from 1 to 3 years before the
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is not a sudden event for firms but
is rather the end of a trajectory experienced by firms that is
significantly different from a healthy firm’s life trajectory.
As our descriptive statistics indicate, even 3 years before
the bankruptcy event, these firms’ economic and financial
situations show signs of difficulties and different behaviors
compared to their healthy counterparts.
Bankrupt firms are, as expected, less productive than
healthy ones. Moreover, productivity begins to deteriorate
3 years before the failure, indicating the Bshadow of death^
effect as described in the firm demography literature.
Furthermore, bankrupt firms also experience difficulties
with respect to profits. Even 3 years before bankruptcy,
these firms are less profitable than healthy firms. The wors-
ening of bankrupt firms’ economic situation is also
reflected in the evolution of their financial structure. As
these firms experience difficulties, the demand for external
financing increases. Therefore, bankruptcy is characterized
by a heavy debt burden. Firms close to bankruptcy may
have greater demand for credit to cover their temporary
financial difficulties rather than for investment projects.
Indeed, in the year of the failure, for example, the average
short-term debt is approximately two times higher than it is
for healthy firms.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics,








Failure Failure as a
percentage
in total obs.
Number of firm-year obs. 74,913 650 0.8 417,575 8402 2.0
Proportion in each category (%)
SMEs 0.89 0.98 0.9 0.94 0.98 2.1
Of which independent SMEs 0.45 0.59 1.1 0.39 0.53 2.7
Intermediate-size and large firm 0.11 0.02 0.2 0.06 0.02 0.8
Very small firm 0.28 0.44 1.3 0.29 0.44 3.0
Small firm 0.18 0.24 1.2 0.23 0.23 2.0
Medium firm 0.20 0.19 0.8 0.22 0.19 1.7
Large firm 0.34 0.13 0.3 0.25 0.14 1.1
Young firm (less than 5 years) 0.05 0.07 1.2 0.05 0.08 3.0
Age (5–10 years) 0.13 0.21 1.3 0.14 0.2 2.9
Age (more than 10 years) 0.82 0.72 0.7 0.81 0.72 1.8
Bad BDF rating 0.05 0.27 4.8 0.05 0.17 7.0
Food products and beverages 1 1 0.8
of which meat products 0.24 0.40 1.4
Textiles, wearing apparel etc. 0.07 0.14 3.6











For bankrupt firms without balance sheet provided to the Banque de France for the year of their bankruptcy, we
assume that their size category and sector are the same as in the last available balance sheet in Banque de France
databases at most 3 years before their bankruptcy. Source: Fiben Bilan and firms’ bankruptcy database, Banque de
France
Independent SME not subsidiary of a corporate group, very small firm total assets ≤1million euros, small firm total
assets one million to two million euros,medium firm total assets two million to five million euros, large firm total
assets >5 million euros
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Higher financial charges are associated with bankruptcy.
On average, the cost of credit is substantially higher for bank-
rupt firms during the year of the failure. On the one hand, this
high cost reflects the nature of the relationship between de-
fault risk and the interest rate set by the bank. A firm’s ex ante
risk level is the primary factor in the cost of credit granted by
the bank. On the other hand, these firms are also penalized by
a higher cost of credit 3 years before the failure. This situation
can lead firms into bankruptcy even if they are economically
viable.
Table 2 also reveals differences between food industry
firms and other manufacturing firms. There is a slight ob-
served gap in productivity between food and manufacturing
firms for both healthy firms and bankrupt firms. In particu-
lar, bankrupt food industry firms are more productive than
bankrupt firms in other manufacturing sectors. On average,
Table 2 Descriptive statistics,
main variables, and full sample,
2001–2012
Food industry Manufacturing industry
(excluding food industries)
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3
TFP
Year of the failure 3.59 3.37 3.62 3.86 3.42 3.07 3.49 3.85
1 year before 3.7 3.45 3.71 3.99 3.64 3.32 3.69 4.02
2 years before 3.81 3.56 3.82 4.08 3.74 3.42 3.78 4.09
3 years before 3.89 3.64 3.87 4.13 3.78 3.46 3.81 4.12
Past 3.85 3.61 3.83 4.1 3.81 3.51 3.83 4.12
No failure 4.19 3.84 4.14 4.48 4.04 3.70 4.02 4.34
Cost of credit
Year of the failure 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.12
1 year before 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.11
2 years before 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.11
3 years before 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.11
Past 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.11
No failure 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.08
Bank debt/total assets
Year of the failure 0.27 0.08 0.23 0.43 0.28 0.09 0.23 0.42
1 year before 0.33 0.14 0.30 0.48 0.28 0.11 0.24 0.41
2 years before 0.29 0.12 0.27 0.43 0.26 0.1 0.22 0.38
3 years before 0.29 0.13 0.25 0.42 0.24 0.08 0.20 0.35
Past 0.3 0.14 0.27 0.43 0.25 0.1 0.21 0.36
No failure 0.21 0.06 0.17 0.32 0.17 0.03 0.11 0.25
Short-term bank debt/total assets
Year of the failure 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.12
1 year before 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.16
2 years before 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.15
3 years before 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.13
Past 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.16
No failure 0.03 0.00 0.0 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03
Profitability
Year of the failure −0.06 −0.18 −0.05 0.05 −0.1 −0.23 −0.07 0.04
1 year before −0.03 −0.13 −0.01 0.07 −0.02 −0.12 0.00 0.09
2 years before 0.02 −0.05 0.03 0.1 0.04 −0.05 0.05 0.14
3 years before 0.06 0 0.06 0.12 0.08 −0.01 0.08 0.16
Past 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.18
No failure 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.18 0.06 0.14 0.25
Note: The row BPast^ corresponds to the variables defined as the mean of their past values at most 3 years before
bankruptcy. Source: Fiben Bilan and firms’ bankruptcy database, Banque de France, and authors’ calculations
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they are also less penalized by high credit costs. Moreover,
food industry firms are more dependent on bank financing,
especially for long-term financing.
Econometric modeling and results
The econometric analysis is based on a binary dependent var-
iable model for the occurrence of the failure. This model raises
a technical difficulty because the proportion of bankrupt com-
panies that provided balance sheet data for the year of failure
is very low (0.5 % of total observations) during the period
2001–2012. Even after accounting for the information gath-
ered at most 3 years before the failure, this proportion remains
low compared to that of healthy firms (only 2 %). The estima-
tion is problematic when considering a binary dependent var-
iable model for the occurrence of the failure. A model with a
constant as the only explanatory variable can systematically
predict non-bankruptcy. In other words, such a model can
perfectly explain nearly 99 % of the values of the dependent
variable. However, this model does not provide any informa-
tion to characterize the failure. A problem in statistical studies
based on data on rare events is that the econometric estimation
procedures may significantly underestimate the probability of
their occurrence. To address this problem, Manski and
Lerman (1977) propose using endogenous stratification,
choice-based sampling. This technique is intended to
overrepresent the rare event, which in our case is the bank-
ruptcy of firms in the sample. The estimation is then obtained
using a weighted endogenous sampling maximum-likelihood
method. Suppose Q1 is the proportion of bankrupt companies
in the initial sample and H1 is the proportion of bankrupt
companies in the sample chosen by the econometrician for
implementing endogenous sampling. Similarly, we define
Q0 = 1 −Q1 and H0 = 1 −H1 for healthy firms.
The weighted endogenous sampling maximum-likelihood















qi= 2Bankruptcy− 1. Bankruptcy is a binary variable that takes
the value 1 if the company is in bankruptcy and 0 otherwise. This
variable is determined by the latent variable Bankruptcy* which is
a function of the explanatory variables (denoted X) for the occur-
rence of the failure. We have the following:
Bankruptcy*it ¼ X
0
itβ þ αi þ ϵit ð9Þ
and






where αi is the individual unobserved effect, and ϵit is the model
error term.
Thus, we must compute the weights w. We estimate a mod-
el in which the probability of bankruptcy during year t is
explained exclusively by the past performance or characteris-
tics of the firm at t − 1, t − 2, and t− 3. The model has the
following form:
Prob Bankruptcyit X i;past; β;αi
  ¼ F αi þ X 0i;pastβ
  ð11Þ
where Xi,past
′ is the mean of the past values of X over at most
3 years (Xi,t − 1, Xi,t − 2, Xi,t − 3). The reason for considering this
specification for our bankruptcy model is twofold. First, as we
have observed from the descriptive statistics, the first bank-
ruptcy signals appear up to 3 years before the failure, and the
past performance or the past characteristics of the firm can
explain its current situation. Second, a large majority of bank-
rupt firms did not provide their balance sheet data at the time
of their failure. Thus, the scarce data from the year of the
failure would substantially restrict the sample. According to
our economic model, the drivers of bankruptcy are low pro-
ductivity (TFP), a high cost of credit, a high bank debt level,
firm age, and size. Our regression also includes annual and
sectoral dummies, which can capture the impact of the mac-
roeconomic environment and firms’ entry rate as a measure of
competition in a given sector. We estimate a probit model
using pooled data with panel-robust standard errors.
The firm demography literature broadly opts for duration
analysis in bankruptcy analysis, as it best controls for the
change in risk prior to bankruptcy. As we described above,
our analysis relies on a probabilistic model of bankruptcy in
the context of binary dependent variable modeling. This
choice was made for two reasons. First, according to our eco-
nomic model, we have adopted an endogenous exit definition
(at each period, firms decide to exit or stay by following a
certain exit rule). Therefore, we consider the exit or bankrupt-
cy to be a binary choice (exit vs. stay) for each firm in each
period. Second, our model addresses the evolutionary nature
of bankruptcy by considering the past values of the explana-
tory variables (the mean of lagged values up to three periods
before period t). Moreover, firm age, as included in our model,
is an indicator of the duration of firm activity and allows us to
approximate a duration analysis approach to bankruptcy under
certain conditions.
Another econometric issue related to our model is the pos-
sible endogeneity of the cost of credit and the share of bank
credit in total assets. Indeed, banks charge riskier firms higher
rates given the probability that they will be unable to honor the
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debt contract. A potential instrumental variable to address this
endogeneity is the average cost of credit in sectors other than
the sector in question, calculated by grouping firms by size
and debt level for each year in our analysis period. Assuming
that the credit market is identical for firms in all sectors, banks
should employ a similar interest rate setting policy for firms in
all sectors. Obviously, the credit costs of a firm in one sector
will be correlated with the credit cost of a firm in another
sector with similar characteristics (size, credit demand), but
it will not be correlated with the bankruptcy risk of firms in
other sectors. We propose an identic construction of the other
instrumental variable for bank credit share. To address the
endogeneity problem, we use a two-step approach based on
a control function from Rivers and Vuong (1988). The two-
step estimation procedure is as follows. We estimate an ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regression of the cost of credit on
instrumental variables (by accounting for possible firm effects
using the Mundlak approach), and we retain the residuals. In
the second step, we estimate our probit regression of bank-
ruptcy by including all exogenous variables, the cost of credit,
and the estimated residuals as explanatory variables. Table 10
in Appendix provides the results of the econometric model
with the estimated residuals. On the one hand, the estimated
residual of the cost of credit is not significant. On the other
hand, the correlation between the instrumental variable and
the cost of credit is very high (Table 11 in Appendix), so this
is not likely due to the weakness of the instrumental variable.
We conclude that there is no endogeneity issue of the cost of
credit. Indeed, the cost of credit we use consists of its past
values. Given the acceptance of the exogeneity of the cost of
credit, Table 3 provides the econometric results based on the
model with only the instrumental variable for bank credit/total
assets variable calculated as the average bank credit in other
sectors than the sector of the firm.
Table 3 resumes our estimation results corresponding to
three different specifications: the columns (1), (2), and (3)
present, respectively, the estimation results of model (1) on
the sample of food industry, (2) on the sample of other
manufacturing industry, and (3) on the sample of manufactur-
ing industry with all sub-sectors. The parameter signs are sim-
ilar between these three models.14
As expected, younger and smaller firms are more likely to
go bankrupt. As a proxy for firm experience, firms that were
active for more than 10 years appear to be less risky. Our
model also confirms that small firms are more vulnerable to
bankruptcy risk than large firms. As expected and in accor-
dance with the theoretical literature, productivity has a nega-
tive and significant impact on bankruptcy (Table 3). Firms
with high productivity are less likely to go bankrupt. The
deterioration of firm productivity can be interpreted as a sign
of possible bankruptcy, even up to 3 years before the bank-
ruptcy event. A higher cost of credit and a higher debt burden
place firms at a higher risk of bankruptcy. We find a positive
and significant impact of the cost of credit on bankruptcy (see
model (1), column (1) in Table 3). By controlling for econom-
ic performance using the TFP level, firms with higher borrow-
ing costs are more likely to go bankrupt. Compared to the
productivity parameter estimate, we find a relatively weaker
role for firm financial variables in the occurrence of bankrupt-
cy. These results are compatible with previous studies consid-
ering a similar model. For example, based on a different def-
inition of and empirical framework for firm exit, Blanchard
et al. (2012) report a significantly negative coefficient of pro-
ductivity in a probit regression of firm exit (close to 0.17) on a
sample of French food industry firms, and Carneiro et al.
(2013) estimate a standard firm failure probit model and find
a negative and significant coefficient for firm TFP (approxi-
mately 0.29). These authors also show that higher firm-level
interest rates and higher debt levels are associated with higher
probabilities of firms shutting down.
We consider also food industry bankrupt firms’ behavior
before and after 2010. Table 4 shows that the parameter esti-
mates have not changed after 2010. It allows us to think that
the dramatic increase of bankruptcies is not due to the change
of the impact of firm’s economic or financial characteristics.
Figures 2 and 3 in Appendix show the evolution of some
economic indicators by comparing food industries and other
manufacturing industries. This analysis allows us to propose
the following possible explanation of bankruptcy patterns’
differences between these two sectors. As the turnover of food
industries decreases slightly during the crisis and value added
increases considerably during the same period, we can con-
clude that the main reason of food industries resilience during
the 2008–2009 crisis is due to the favorable evolution of fac-
tors linked to the intermediate consumption. Concerning the
period 2010–2012, as we do not found a worsening of the
impact of financial conditions, other factors can explain these
differences such as competitiveness issues, the cut of subsi-
dies, etc.. These hypotheses need to be confirmed in a frame-
work of empirical analysis and are out of the scope of our
paper.
The food industry appears to be the least risky manufactur-
ing industry sub-sector. Indeed, the predicted bankruptcy rate
in the food industry is half the one in other manufacturing
sectors (Table 5). This result confirms the low proportion of
bankrupt firms in the food industry, as seen in our descriptive
analysis. The bankruptcy risk for very small and very young
food industry firms is nearly half that to very small and very
young firms, respectively, in other manufacturing industries.
Our model confirms the differences in the evolution of bank-
ruptcy risk during the crisis and after the crisis for the food
industries and for other manufacturing industries. Indeed,
14 Moreover, a likelihood ratio test shows that model (1) and model (3)
are not different and the same conclusions on parameter estimates can be
maintained for food industry and overall manufacturing firms.
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between 2008 and 2009, the predicted probability of bank-
ruptcy decreases for food industry firms, whereas it increases
by 0.8 percentage points for other manufacturing industries.
Moreover, our predicted bankruptcy probability results cor-
rectly show that the bankruptcy risk increase in the food in-
dustry from 2010 until 2012.
Within the food industry, we observe significant differ-
ences in bankruptcy risk patterns for the meat industry com-
pared to other food industries. Indeed, the meat industry is
characterized by a higher probability of bankruptcy (1.5 %)
relative to other food industries (0.7 %). The bankruptcy risk
gap between these two sub-industries is more important for
small and very small firms and for young firms. We also find
that the increased bankruptcy risk in the food industry be-
tween 2010 and 2012 is mostly due to difficulties in the meat
industry. This finding reflects the observed vulnerability of the
French meat industry during the period 2010–2012. In 2013,
the bankruptcy risk decreases slightly in the food industry but
remains high relative to the average level for the period 2001–
2010.
The predicted probability of bankruptcy is nearly 4.5 % for
manufacturing firms at the lowest productivity level (first per-
centile) (Table 6). The bankruptcy risk decreases considerably
(up to 3–4 percentage points) for firms in the upper part of the
productivity distribution. However, the effect of financial var-
iables on bankruptcy risk appears to be less important than
Table 3 Parameter estimates, probit regression of firm bankruptcy using WEML on choice-based samples, 2001–2012
mean(Xi,t − 1, Xi,t − 2, Xi,t − 3) Food industry (1) Manufacturing industry
(excluding food industry) (2)
Manufacturing industry
(all sectors) (3)
TFP −0.429*** (0.039) −0.323*** (0.011) −0.328*** (0.010)
Cost of credit 0.031*** (0.003) 0.027*** (0.001) 0.027*** (0.001)
Bank credit/total assets 0.009*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.000) 0.013*** (0.000)
Age (less than 5 years) ref. ref. ref.
Age (5–10 years) −0.060 (0.064) −0.138*** (0.020) −0.131*** (0.019)
Age (more than 10 years) −0.180** (0.057) −0.331*** (0.017) −0.318*** (0.016)
Very small firm ref. ref. ref.
Small firm −0.029 (0.040) −0.134*** (0.013) −0.126*** (0.012)
Medium firm −0.071 (0.044) −0.162*** (0.013) −0.155*** (0.013)
Large firm −0.203*** (0.049) −0.179*** (0.015) −0.184*** (0.014)
Electric, computer and electronic products etc. ref. ref.
Food industry −0.410*** (0.020)
Transport equipment −0.048 (0.029) −0.045 (0.029)
Other manufacturing −0.153***(0.014) −0.152*** (0.014)
Constant −0.986*** (0.175) −0.973*** (0.050) −0.959*** (0.048)
Annual dummies Yes Yes Yes
IV average bank credit in other sectors Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 31,583 191,019 222,602
Number of firms 3545 23,444 26,989
LogL −1527.0 −17,414.3 −18,960.0
LogL for null model −1658.6 −18,687.1 −20,452.0
Wald test, chi-square 537.4 4739.3 5470.9
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square (18) (number of groups = 20) 11.03 14.44 21.82
WEML weight for non bankruptcy observations 1.348 1.350 1.350
WEML weight for bankruptcy observations 0.067 0.068 0.068
Standard errors in parentheses. Panel-robust standard errors. Notes: Choice-based sampling is realized on observation level. Sampled firm-year obser-
vations were completed with available observations for the same panel from the original database. WEML weights were calculated for each year
separately, but this table presents only the average WEML weights over our analysis period. Choice-based sampling is realized on the full sample of
manufacturing industry. The sub-samples of the food industry and of the manufacturing industry (excluding food industry) were extracted from
manufacturing industry choice-based sample. Comparison of parameter estimates between (1) and (2)
H0 : β
1ð Þ
t fp ¼ β 2ð Þt fp; chi‐square ¼ 7:58; Prob > chi‐square ¼ 0:00: H0 : β
1ð Þ
CostCredit ¼ β 2ð ÞCostCredit; chi‐square ¼ 2:09; Prob > chi‐square ¼ 0:14:
H0 : β
1ð Þ
BankCredit ¼ β 2ð ÞBankCredit; chi‐square ¼ 5:25; Prob > chi‐square ¼ 0:02
IV instrumental variable, WEML weighted exogenous maximum likelihood weight
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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that of productivity. For example, for manufacturing firms
charged an interest rate of approximately 9 %, bankruptcy risk
would decrease by only 1 percentage point if they had no
financial charges. The predicted bankruptcy rate also has a
lower sensitivity to bank debt levels. For example, comparing
firms with a bank debt level of approximately 5% of their total
assets to those that are nearly ten times more indebted (44 %
bank debt level), the predicted probability gap is only 2.5
percentage points. Only firms reporting an extreme upper lev-
el (90th percentile level and higher) of financial charges and
bank debt levels exhibit a bankruptcy risk that is close to
alarming (more than 3 %). Moreover, comparing the differ-
ences in the predicted probabilities of the three variables at
their 10th and 90th percentile values, we demonstrate that firm
productivity has a greater effect on bankruptcy risk. Indeed,
for example, in the food industry, the probability of bankrupt-
cy decreases by approximately 1 percentage point if produc-
tivity increases from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile
value. This contrast is lower when considering the cost of
credit and the bank debt ratio (bankruptcy risk increases by
1.5 and 3 percentage points, respectively, in the case of a
change from the 10th to the 90th percentile values).
We find also that the productivity effect is lower for
food industry firms compared to other manufacturing
firms. Indeed, the beneficial effect from food industry
firms’ productivity growth corresponds to a decrease in
bankruptcy risk of only 1 percentage point (comparing
predicted probabilities calculated at the 10th and 90th
percentile values of TFP). This effect is more important
in other manufacturing industries (for which bankruptcy
risk decreases by approximately 1.73 percentage points).
The comparison of marginal effects (Table 14 in
Appendix) confirms these disparities. Indeed, a 1-point
increase in TFP decreases the probability of bankruptcy
by 1.21 and 0.82, respectively, for food industry firms and
other manufacturing firms.
Table 4 Parameter estimates, probit regression of firm bankruptcy using WEML on choice-based samples, food industry, and other manufacturing
industries (excluding food industries)
Food industry Other manufacturing industries
(excluding food industries)
Before 2010 (1) After 2010 (2) Before 2010 (3) After 2010 (4)
TFP −0.397*** (0.045) −0.508*** (0.075) −0.315*** (0.012) −0.332*** (0.019)
Cost of credit 0.032*** (0.004) 0.028*** (0.007) 0.027*** (0.001) 0.023*** (0.002)
Bank credit/total assets 0.009*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.000) 0.011*** (0.001)
Age (less than 5 years) ref. ref. ref. ref.
Age (5–10 years) −0.088 (0.071) 0.060 (0.147) −0.124*** (0.021) −0.257*** (0.048)
Age (more than 10 years) −0.224*** (0.062) −0.008 (0.136) −0.303*** (0.018) −0.536*** (0.041)
Very small firm ref. ref. ref. ref.
Small firm −0.010 (0.049) −0.074 (0.072) −0.131*** (0.014) −0.137*** (0.024)
Medium firm −0.068 (0.053) −0.088 (0.078) −0.149*** (0.015) −0.181*** (0.026)
Large firm −0.191*** (0.057) −0.236* (0.096) −0.149*** (0.017) −0.237*** (0.030)
Constant −1.099*** (0.201) −0.748* (0.338) −1.144*** (0.055) −0.612*** (0.089)
Annual dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV average bank credit in other sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 22,316 9267 141,627 49,392
Number of firms 3331 2652 22,706 14,528
LogL −1083.9 −441.6 −13,368.2 −4065.1
LogL for null model −1175.7 −482.9 −14,302.5 −4375.1
Wald test, chi-square 388.0 170.7 3452.7 1384.0
WEML weight for non bankruptcy observations 1.363 1.309 1.365 1.309
WEML weight for bankruptcy observations 0.068 0.066 0.069 0.065
Standard errors in parentheses. Panel-robust standard errors. Notes: Choice-based sampling is realized on observation-level. Sampled firm-year obser-
vations were completed with available observations for the same panel from the original database. WEML weights were calculated for each year
separately, but this table presents only the average WEML weights over our analysis period. Choice-based sampling is realized on the full sample of
manufacturing industry. The sub-samples of the food industry and of the manufacturing industry (excluding food industry) were extracted from
manufacturing industry choice-based sample
IV instrumental variable, WEML weighted exogenous maximum likelihood weight
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Economic and financial determinants of firm bankruptcy 99
Table 5 Predicted adjusted probability of bankruptcy, %




Meat industry Food industries
(excluding meat industry)
Full sample 0.955 1.532 0.772 2.144 1.978
Very small firm 1.67 2.342 1.394 3.337 3.129
Small firm 1.258 1.909 1.038 2.131 2.033
Medium firm 0.89 1.263 0.767 1.773 1.663
Large firm 0.343 0.641 0.273 1.163 1.006
Age (less than 5 years) 2.13 2.962 1.84 4.069 3.846
Age (5–10 years) 1.624 2.337 1.378 3.117 2.933
Age (more than 10 years) 0.779 1.298 0.617 1.829 1.676
2007 0.859 1.441 0.687 1.544 1.452
2008 0.966 1.613 0.777 1.715 1.612
2009 0.752 1.26 0.6 2.525 2.261
2010 0.692 1.097 0.575 1.916 1.733
2011 0.813 1.272 0.683 1.831 1.677
2012 1.197 1.787 1.022 1.862 1.765
2013 1.095 1.575 0.95 1.891 1.766
Notes: This table presents adjusted prediction, i.e., the predicted value of the probability of bankruptcy, while holding all other variables at their observed
value in the sample. We compared the predictions of bankruptcy probability for meat industry on different possible models by sample type, weighting
type, and presence of dummy variable for meat industry. We chose among these predictions the most accurate prediction based on its closeness with the
observed bankruptcy rate in the meat industry
Table 6 Predicted probability of bankruptcy (%) at quantiles of continuous variables
TFP
Food industry Manufacturing industries (excluding food industries) Manufacturing industry
TFP quantile Predicted prob. TFP quantile Predicted prob. TFP quantile Predicted prob.
p1 2.907 2.679 2.649 4.851 2.677 4.494
p10 3.556 1.393 3.340 3.065 3.366 2.808
p25 3.784 1.090 3.649 2.464 3.671 2.252
p50 4.072 0.791 3.963 1.959 3.977 1.790
p75 4.413 0.532 4.270 1.554 4.290 1.404
p90 4.790 0.336 4.600 1.201 4.627 1.071
p99 5.733 0.096 5.550 0.543 5.589 0.469
Cost of credit
Cost of credit quantile Predicted prob. Cost of credit quantile Predicted prob. Cost of credit quantile Predicted prob.
p1 0.000 0.568 0.000 1.285 0.000 1.187
p10 0.021 0.678 0.026 1.522 0.026 1.402
p25 0.036 0.766 0.043 1.689 0.042 1.554
p50 0.051 0.861 0.062 1.905 0.060 1.748
p75 0.072 1.016 0.096 2.332 0.092 2.127
p90 0.106 1.318 0.148 3.155 0.143 2.869
p99 0.215 2.874 0.276 6.230 0.271 5.748
Bank debt/total assets
Bank debt ratio quantile Predicted prob. Bank debt ratio quantile Predicted prob. Bank debt ratio quantile Predicted prob.
p1 0.000 0.496 0.000 1.025 0.000 0.945
p10 0.017 0.517 0.007 1.050 0.008 0.970
p25 0.073 0.592 0.046 1.193 0.049 1.108
p50 0.181 0.764 0.134 1.592 0.140 1.484
p75 0.330 1.074 0.273 2.438 0.282 2.274
p90 0.484 1.503 0.432 3.845 0.440 3.557
p99 0.758 2.635 0.767 8.964 0.765 8.033
Note: This table presents adjusted prediction, i.e., the predicted value of the probability of bankruptcy at quantiles, while holding all variables at their
observed value in the sample
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The effects of firms’ financing conditions reveal different
patterns for the two sectors. On the one hand, the probability
of bankruptcy increases almost equally for food industries and
other manufacturing industries if credit becomes costly (the
change from the 10th to the 90th percentile values of credit
cost in each group of firms, which corresponds to a variation
in credit cost from 0.02 to 0.10 and to a variation in credit cost
from 0.02 to 0.14, respectively). On the other hand, a change
in the bank debt level has a lower effect on bankruptcy risk for
the food industry than for other manufacturing industries.
Indeed, comparing the differences in the predicted probabili-
ties between the 10th and the 90th percentile values for the
bank debt ratio in each sector, our results show that the differ-
ence in the food industry is less than half the difference in
other manufacturing industries (0.5 percentage points and
2.6 percentage points, respectively). When comparing mar-
ginal effects for financial variables between the two sectors
(Table 14 in Appendix), we find that if the credit cost increases
by 1 unit, food firms probability of bankruptcy increases by
0.08 percentage point which is very close to the marginal
effect of the cost of credit calculated for other manufacturing
industries. However, the marginal effect of bank credit vari-
able is lower for food industries compared to the one obtained
for other manufacturing firms. Thus, compared to other
manufacturing industries, food industries appear to be more
sensible to productivity shocks and less sensible to bank credit
impact on their probability risk.
Conclusion
This study identifies the role of economic and financial vari-
ables in determining firm bankruptcy. We demonstrate that
smaller and younger firms are the most vulnerable. Of the
manufacturing sub-sectors, the food industry appears to be
more resilient to bankruptcy risks: its predicted probability is
half the one in other manufacturing sectors. The bankruptcy
predictions based on our model confirm the dramatic increase
in bankruptcy risk in the French food industry observed over
the current period. We also show that among food industry
sub-sectors, the meat industry was primarily responsible for
the evolution of bankruptcy risk between 2010 and 2012.
According to our results, higher productivity reduces bank-
ruptcy risk, whereas a higher cost of credit increases bankrupt-
cy risk. These results suggest that the economic performance
of firms is not the only determinant of firm success (i.e., con-
tinuing activity in the market); firms’ financing constraints,
such as higher borrowing costs, can also challenge firm sur-
vival. However, in relative terms, the productivity effect ap-
pears to be more important for bankruptcy risk than financial
situation indicators. We observe smaller effects of firm finan-
cial characteristics (credit cost, bank debt level) on firms’
bankruptcy risk. In contrast, productivity appears to have an
important beneficial effect on bankruptcy risk reduction.
These results suggest that policies designed to implement pro-
ductivity improvement measures are the most efficient for
reducing bankruptcy risk in the food industry or the
manufacturing sector. In this case, firms’ financing conditions
only affect bankruptcy risk if firms finance projects intended
to increase their productivity, such as investing in innovative
machines and qualified workers.
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Appendix 1: data description
Fiben Bilan database
Fiben accounting data are extracted from the individual com-
pany accounts collected yearly through the branch network of
the Banque de France (balance sheet and income statements).
They are based on fiscal documents. The target population
includes companies and natural and legal persons that are
domiciled or have registered offices in France. A broad range
of information includes accounting and financial data from the
balance sheet and profit-and-loss account, for companies with
a turnover of at least 750,000 euros or companies with bank
debt exceeding 380,000 euros.
Bankruptcy database
The Banque de France manages a database of legal informa-
tion pertaining to judgments handed down by a commercial or
a civil court ruling over a commercial case. The information is
gathered from a variety of sources, including journals of legal
notices, registries of commercial courts, France’s National
Statistics Office (INSEE). In this study, the firm bankruptcy
is defined as the start of the judicial reorganization or liquida-
tion proceedings according to the French law. If a firm has
entered two of these proceedings during our observation peri-
od, only the first collective insolvency proceedings are taken
into account (Table 7).
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Sample description
Merging data from the balance sheet database (Fiben Bilan)
and the firms’ bankruptcy database
The sample obtained by merging data from Fiben Bilan and
the firm’ bankruptcy database includes only a small number of
bankrupt firms. One of the main reasons is that a company
subject to a court-administered proceeding (reorganization or
liquidation) does not always provide its balance sheet for the
year of failure. Thus, we link the failure occurred during the
specific year by mobilizing balance sheet data from previous
years. In more than 80 % of cases, companies do not provide
data about their balance sheet during the year of failure, and
almost 50 % do not provide these data 1 year before their
failure as well. Thus, we use data on the latest non-missing
balance sheet collected as long as it relates to the firm’s situ-
ation during the year of the firm failure or at most 3 years
before the failure. It is a way to cover the low number of
failure data and analyze the impact of the defined ratios on
the bankruptcy at a time when these bankrupt companies still
have a significant activity (see Table 8).
Econometric sample construction
The sample obtained from merging data from the balance
sheet database (Fiben Bilan) and the firms’ bankruptcy
database was further modified for the empirical analysis.
First, our econometric model continuous variables’ outliers
were dropped from the sample. To do that, we deleted all
observations that are lower (higher) than the threshold value
calculated as Q1 − 5 ∗ IQR (Q3 + 5 ∗ IQR) where Q1 (Q3) is
the first (third) quartile and IQR is the interquartile range.
Second, as we decided to use the information at most 3 years
before bankruptcy, for each firm, new observations were com-
pleted for the missing years on the basis of the past available
information concerning the variables that were used in our
analysis. In particular, for bankrupt firms without balance
sheet provided to the Banque de France for the year of their
bankruptcy, we assume that their size category and sector are
the same as in the last available balance sheet in Banque de
France databases at most 3 years before their bankruptcy.
Concerning the continuous variables, we calculated new var-
iables, defined as the average of their past available observa-
tions at most 3 years before the bankruptcy. Concerning firms
for which only one observation or two observations are avail-
able in the past at most 3 years before the bankruptcy, new
variables are calculated respectively as equal to the 1-year
lagged observation or as the average of their two past available
observations.
These new variables were particularly used in the econo-
metric part. The table describes this new extended database
(Table 9).














1998 5457 1225 502 70 3660
1999 5465 1200 514 65 3751
2000 4626 1093 467 67 3066
2001 4375 1060 455 71 2860
2002 4789 1031 481 63 3277
2003 5037 1025 526 75 3486
2004 4758 1078 461 62 3219
2005 4507 1003 416 69 3088
2006 4176 1037 380 66 2759
2007 3745 1134 306 41 2305
2008 3943 1176 290 69 2477
2009 4593 1141 371 105 3081
2010 4058 1193 310 75 2555
2011 3914 1308 232 57 2374
2012 3921 1388 256 91 2277
2013 3565 1284 219 71 2062
Source: Firms’ bankruptcy database, Banque de France
Table 8 Bankruptcy observations in Fiben Bilan over the period 1998–
2012, manufacturing sector
1998–2012
Bankrupt firms with recent financial
statements at least once
15,838 100 %
at most 3 years before bankruptcy 13,967 88 %
Year of the failure 3484 22 %
1 year before the failure 5563 35 %
2 years before the failure 3917 25 %
3 years before the failure 1003 6 %
More than 3 years before the failure 1871 12 %
Table 9 Econometric sample (before choice-based sampling), 2001–
2012
Food industry Manufacturing industry
(excluding food industry)
Number of firms 10,377 56,988
Number of firm-year obs. 75,620 417,467
Failure 650 8402
No failure 74,970 409,065
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Bankruptcy rate and method of computation
of bankruptcy rate in Fiben Bilan
Companies that are subject to collective insolvency proceed-
ings rarely provide the Banque de France with recent account-
ing documentation. We take into account this fact when cal-
culating the failure rate using the database of firms’ financial
statements. We calculate the failure rate on a population of
firms that have provided their balance sheet data during the
previous 3 years to the year N. We select all the healthy firms
on 1 January of year N for which the data for previous 3 years
are available in the database: N − 1, N − 2, or N − 3. Then, we
count, among these firms, those who start a judicial reorgani-
zation or liquidation between 1 January and 31 December of
year N. The ratio of these two quantities is equal to the annual
failure rate of the firms with a balance sheet available infor-
mation during the past 3 years.
Appendix 2: definition of variables
TFP We have calculated TFP using Levinsohn and Petrin’s
(2003) method. It is one of the most commonly applied esti-
mators when estimating total factor productivity at the estab-
lishment level.
Cost of credit: Interest expenses divided by financial debt
Bank debt: Short-term bank credit and long-term bank
loans
Firm size: We use two categories of firm size: small- or
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and non-SMEs (inter-
mediate-sized enterprises (ISEs) and large enterprises).
The definition of these categories in this study is based
on three criteria: number of employees, annual turnover,
and balance sheet assets. The SMEs employ fewer than
250 people, and their annual sales do not exceed 50 mil-
lion euros or their total assets do not exceed 43 million
euros. The firms not corresponding to these criteria are
considered as non-SMEs.
Subsidiary of a corporate group: A group is a set of
companies (subsidiar ies) interl inked through
shareholdings and controlled by a single company.
Manufacturing industry: We consider four sub-sectors of
manufacturing industry:
1. Food industry: manufacture of food products, bever-
ages, and tobacco products.
2. Electrical, computers, electronic products, etc.: manu-
facture of electrical, computer, and electronic equipment;
manufacture of machinery; manufacture of coke and re-
fined petroleum products.
3. Transport equipment: manufacture of transport
equipment.
4. Other manufacturing: manufacture of textiles, wood
and paper products, chemicals, rubber and plastics prod-
ucts, basic metals, etc.
Manufacture of food industry: In this study, food industry
includes the following sub-sectors: the processing and
preserving of meat and production of meat products; the
processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans, and mol-
lusks; the processing and preserving of fruit and vegeta-
bles; the manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and
fats; the manufacture of dairy products; the manufacture
of grain mill products, starches, and starch products; the
manufacture of bakery and farinaceous products; the
manufacture of other food products; the manufacture of
prepared animal feeds; the manufacture of beverages; and
the manufacture of tobacco products.
Appendix 3: French food industry: some economic
indicators
Fig. 2 Economic activity
indicators, by sector (1998 = 100)
(a, b). Source: Fiben Bilan
(Banque de France) and authors’
calculations
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Fig. 3 Food industry demand perspectives: consumption of food products, beverages, and tobacco products. Source: INSEE (French Statistical Office)
and authors’ calculations
Table 10 Parameter estimates and probit regression of firm bankruptcy using WEML on choice-based samples, 2001–2012
mean(Xi,t − 1, Xi,t − 2, Xi,t − 3) Food industry (1) Manufacturing industries
(excluding food industries) (2)
Manufacturing industries
(all sectors) (3)
TFP −0.431*** (0.040) −0.323*** (0.011) −0.328*** (0.010)
Cost of credit 0.026 (0.017) 0.029*** (0.005) 0.028*** (0.004)
Bank credit/total assets 0.009*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.001)
Age (less than 5 years) ref. ref. ref.
Age (5–10 years) −0.059 (0.064) −0.139*** (0.020) −0.131*** (0.019)
Age (more than 10 years) −0.179** (0.057) −0.332*** (0.017) −0.318*** (0.016)
Very small firm ref. ref. ref.
Small firm −0.031 (0.041) −0.134*** (0.013) −0.126*** (0.012)
Medium firm −0.074 (0.044) −0.161*** (0.014) −0.155*** (0.013)
Large firm −0.209*** (0.050) −0.177*** (0.016) −0.183*** (0.015)
Electric, computer and electronic products, etc. ref. ref.
Food industry −0.410*** (0.020)
Transport equipment −0.048 (0.029) −0.045 (0.029)
Other manufacturing −0.155*** (0.014) −0.153*** (0.014)
Constant −0.926*** (0.246) −0.992*** (0.070) −0.965*** (0.067)
Cost of credit residual IV 0.611 (1.753) −0.182 (0.465) −0.054 (0.447)
Bank credit residual IV −0.290 (0.222) −0.796*** (0.073) −0.760*** (0.070)
Appendix 3: additional results
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Table 11 Correlation




Cost of credit IV average cost







Cost of credit 1.00
IV average cost of credit in other sectors 0.33 1.00
Bank credit/total assets 1.00
IV average bank credit in othersectors 0.70 1.00
Table 10 (continued)
mean(Xi,t − 1, Xi,t − 2, Xi,t − 3) Food industry (1) Manufacturing industries
(excluding food industries) (2)
Manufacturing industries
(all sectors) (3)
Annual dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 31,583 191,019 222,602
Number of firms 3545 23,444 26,989
LogL −1527.0 −17,414.3 −18,960.0
LogL for null model −1658.6 −18,687.1 −20,452.0
Wald test, chi-square 537.2 4741.3 5472.1
WEML weight for non bankruptcy observations 1.348 1.350 1.350
WEML weight for bankruptcy observations 0.067 0.068 0.068
Standard errors in parentheses. Panel-robust standard errors. Notes: Choice-based sampling is realized on observation-level. Sampled firm-year obser-
vations were completed with available observations for the same panel from the original database. WEML weights were calculated for each year
separately, but this table presents only the average WEML weights over our analysis period. Choice-based sampling is realized on the full sample of
manufacturing industry. The sub-samples of the food industry and of the manufacturing industry (excluding food industry) were extracted from
manufacturing industry choice-based sample. Comparison of parameter estimates between (1) and (2) H0 : β
1ð Þ
t fp ¼ β 2ð Þt fp; chi‐square ¼ 7:24: H0
: β 1ð ÞCostCredit ¼ β 2ð ÞCostCredit; chi‐square ¼ 0:33: H0 : β 1ð ÞBankCredit ¼ β 2ð ÞBankCredit; chi‐square ¼ 2:34:
IV instrumental variable, WEML weighted exogenous maximum likelihood weight
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 12 Parameter estimates and probit regression of firm bankruptcy using WEML on choice-based samples, manufacturing industry, 2001–2012
(Xi,t − 1) (Xi,t − 2) (Xi,t − 3)
TFP −0.271*** (0.022) −0.234*** (0.021) −0.155*** (0.019)
Cost of credit 0.016*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.001)
Bank credit/total assets 0.012*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001)
Age (less than 5 years) ref. ref. ref.
Age (5–10 years) −0.188*** (0.038) −0.239*** (0.034) −0.192*** (0.034)
Age (more than 10 years) −0.277*** (0.030) −0.437*** (0.029) −0.412*** (0.029)
Very small firm ref. ref. ref.
Small firm −0.045 (0.033) −0.068* (0.029) −0.078** (0.028)
Medium firm −0.078* (0.037) −0.102** (0.032) −0.205*** (0.029)
Large firm −0.052 (0.041) −0.114** (0.037) −0.241*** (0.033)
Electrical, computer and electronic products etc. ref. ref. ref.
Food industry −0.487*** (0.054) −0.386*** (0.048) −0.313*** (0.045)
Transport equipment −0.015 (0.082) 0.005 (0.067) 0.048 (0.065)
Other manufacturing −0.090* (0.037) −0.045 (0.033) −0.068* (0.031)
Constant −1.167*** (0.109) −0.761*** (0.098) −1.294*** (0.088)
Annual dummies Yes Yes Yes
IVAverage bank credit in other sectors Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12 (continued)
(Xi,t − 1) (Xi,t − 2) (Xi,t − 3)
Number of obs. 8915 10,003 12,760
Number of firms 4725 5494 7025
LogL −911.5 −1358.5 −1414.8
LogL for null model −975.7 −1441.8 −1495.0
Wald test, chi-square 644.5 778.2 807.9
WEML weight for non bankruptcy observations 1.434 1.617 1.474
WEML weight for bankruptcy observations 0.072 0.082 0.074
Standard errors in parentheses. Panel-robust standard errors. Notes: Choice-based sampling is realized on observation-level. Sampled firm-year obser-
vations were completed with available observations for the same panel from the original database. WEML weights were calculated for each year
separately, but this table presents only the average WEML weights over our analysis period. Choice-based sampling is realized on the full sample of
manufacturing industry. The sub-samples of the food industry and of the manufacturing industry (excluding food industry) were extracted from the
manufacturing industry choice-based sample
IV instrumental variable, WEML weighted exogenous maximum likelihood weight
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 13 Parameter estimates and probit regression of firm bankruptcy using WEML on choice-based samples, manufacturing industry, 2001–2012
mean(Xi,t − 1, Xi,t − 2, Xi,t − 3) Without random effects (1) With random effects (2) With Mundlak variables (3)
TFP −0.328*** (0.010) −0.484*** (0.019) −0.657*** (0.037)
Cost of credit 0.027*** (0.001) 0.037*** (0.001) 0.023*** (0.003)
Bank credit/total assets 0.013*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.001) 0.025*** (0.002)
Age (less than 5 years) ref. ref. ref.
Age (5–10 years) −0.131*** (0.019) −0.110*** (0.024) −0.051 (0.040)
Age (more than 10 years) −0.318*** (0.016) −0.336*** (0.021) 0.086 (0.062)
Very small firm ref. ref. ref.
Small firm −0.126*** (0.012) −0.171*** (0.018) −0.111*** (0.021)
Medium firm −0.155*** (0.013) −0.206*** (0.019) −0.162*** (0.022)
Large firm −0.184*** (0.014) −0.240*** (0.021) −0.237*** (0.026)
Electric, computer and electronic products, etc. ref. ref. ref.
Food industry −0.410*** (0.020) −0.600*** (0.034) −0.281*** (0.036)
Transport equipment −0.045 (0.029) −0.070 (0.043) 0.003 (0.052)
Other manufacturing −0.152*** (0.014) −0.217*** (0.021) −0.090*** (0.024)
Constant −0.959*** (0.048) −0.432*** (0.063) 1139.140*** (17.191)
Annual dummies Yes Yes Yes
IV average bank credit in other sectors Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak variables No No Yes
Number of obs. 222,602 222,602 22,260
LogL −18,960.0 −34,596.5 −13,789.0
Wald test, chi-square 5470.9 2797.1 13,326.1
WEML weight for non bankruptcy observations 1.350 1.350 1.350
WEML weight for bankruptcy observations 0.068 0.068 0.068
Standard errors in parentheses. Panel-robust standard errors. Notes: Choice-based sampling is realized on observation-level. Sampled firm-year obser-
vations were completed with available observations for the same panel from the original database. WEML weights were calculated for each year
separately, but this table presents only the average WEML weights over our analysis period. Choice-based sampling is realized on the full sample of
manufacturing industry. The sub-samples of the food industry and of the manufacturing industry (excluding food industry) were extracted from the
manufacturing industry choice-based sample
IV instrumental variable, WEML weighted exogenous maximum likelihood weight
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 14 Marginal effects and probit regression of firm bankruptcy using WEML on choice-based samples, 2001–2012
mean(Xi,t − 1, Xi,t − 2, Xi,t − 3) Food industry (1) Manufacturing industries
(excluding food industries) (2)
Manufacturing industries
(all sectors) (3)
TFP −1.221*** (0.113) −0.820*** (0.027) −0.844*** (0.027)
Cost of credit 0.089*** (0.010) 0.068*** (0.002) 0.070*** (0.002)
Bank credit/total assets 0.025*** (0.004) 0.034*** (0.001) 0.033*** (0.001)
Age (less than 5 years) ref. ref. ref.
Age (5–10 years) −0.163 (0.174) −0.324*** (0.046) −0.313*** (0.044)
Age (more than 10 years) −0.501** (0.155) −0.805*** (0.039) −0.786*** (0.038)
Very small firm ref. ref. ref.
Small firm −0.080 (0.112) −0.335*** (0.032) −0.319*** (0.031)
Medium firm −0.197 (0.122) −0.406*** (0.034) −0.395*** (0.033)
Large firm −0.581*** (0.141) −0.450*** (0.038) −0.471*** (0.037)
Electric, computer and electronic products etc. ref. ref.
Food industry −1.071*** (0.054)
Transport equipment −0.116 (0.072) −0.111 (0.072)
Other manufacturing −0.382*** (0.034) −0.380*** (0.034)
Annual dummies Yes Yes Yes
IVaverage bank credit in other sectors Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 31,583 191,019 222,602
Standard errors in parentheses. Panel-robust standard errors. Notes: Choice-based sampling is realized on observation-level. Sampled firm-year obser-
vations were completed with available observations for the same panel from the original database. WEML weights were calculated for each year
separately, but this table presents only the average WEML weights over our analysis period. Choice-based sampling is realized on the full sample of
manufacturing industry. The sub-samples of the food industry and of the manufacturing industry (excluding food industry) were extracted from the
manufacturing industry choice-based sample
IV instrumental variable, WEML weighted exogenous maximum likelihood weight
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 15 Descriptive statistics,
main variables, and full sample,
2001–2012
Food industry Manufacturing industries (excl. food industries)
Mean Comparison of means Mean Comparison of means
T test p value T test p value
TFP
Year of the failure 3.59 −16.361 0.000 3.42 −14.719 0.000
1 year before 3.7 −15.424 0.000 3.64 −12.407 0.000
2 years before 3.81 −11.945 0.000 3.74 −11.000 0.000
3 years before 3.89 −10.691 0.000 3.78 −9.814 0.000
No failure 4.19 4.04
Cost of credit
Year of the failure 0.07 8.210 0.000 0.09 13.088 0.000
1 year before 0.07 6.877 0.000 0.09 11.738 0.000
2 years before 0.07 6.942 0.000 0.09 9.761 0.000
3 years before 0.07 8.096 0.000 0.09 10.171 0.000
No failure 0.05 0.07
Bank debt/total assets
Year of the failure 0.27 12.265 0.000 0.28 16.938 0.000
1 year before 0.33 12.004 0.000 0.28 14.758 0.000
2 years before 0.29 8.754 0.000 0.26 15.807 0.000
3 years before 0.29 7.159 0.000 0.24 10.933 0.000
No failure 0.21 0.17
Note: Test of comparisons of means was conducted by comparing each category of bankruptcy lines with healthy
firms’ observations. Source: Fiben Bilan and firms’ bankruptcy database, Banque de France, and authors’
calculations
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